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# Intelligence—I

## One of Weakest Links in Our Security, Survey Shows—Omissions, Duplications

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America's first line of defense in the atomic age—a world-wide intelligence service—is today one of the weakest links in our national security.

This is the conclusion of this correspondent after a careful survey of our intelligence activities, and it is a conclusion with which most of our informed authorities emphatically agree.

The evidences are legion. Friction has been pronounced between various intelligence agencies of Government—particularly between the new post-war Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department; between the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and between the CIA and the Atomic Energy Commission.

There is unnecessary duplication and overlapping; at the same time, there are serious omissions of intelligence, and there is considerable expensive "empire-building." Worst of all, many of the personnel being utilized to evaluate intelligence reports are definitely second-rate, able to earn more money in Washington in Federal employment than they could earn on college campuses or in other civilian occupations.

### Know Little of Soviet Strength

The result today is a marked depreciation in the quantity and quality of our intelligence as compared to the war years. Our knowledge of Russian strength is admittedly fragmentary, and many of the estimates by different Government agencies are conflicting—so widely divergent in some cases that they are impossible to reconcile. Our information about Russian atomic energy activities is notable for its scarcity.

These facts, a growing sense of frustration and discouragement among some intelligence personnel, which has led to the resignations from CIA and Army G-2 of some of the best civilian personnel, and several intelligence fiascos since the war, climaxed by Bogotá, have brought about an investigative survey of the whole intelligence structure of Government. It was learned.

Allen W. Dulles, who occupied a prominent role in Switzerland with the Office of Strategic Services during the war; William H. Jackson, New York lawyer and wartime intelligence officer, and Mathias F. Correa, former OSS official, have been surveying our intelligence organization and its operations at the request of the White

House and the National Security Council.

The survey, a continuing one which will end with a report by next January, is studying not only the Central Intelligence Agency, but also the inter-relationship of this agency with the intelligence activities of the State, Army, Air Force, and Navy Departments and the FBI. As a result of the study some changes already have been made, and others—perhaps of a sweeping nature—are predicted. Considerable shifts of personnel, particularly in the Central Intelligence Agency, have occurred, or are occurring although some of them pre-dated the Dulles commission's appointment.

### Changes Going On in CIA

Apparently as a direct result of the Dulles inquiry some strange "finaglings" have been going on in the Central Intelligence Agency. Last year coincident with the transfer of its director, the office of collection and dissemination, one of six principal offices in the agency, was abolished. Today it has been restored under another head and is bigger than ever.

After the Dulles survey started a considerable section of the office of administration and management, a lopsidedly large and overstuffed office which was supposed to shuffle paper work for the benefit of the operating forces but had become in some ways the tail that wagged the dog, was seemingly "eliminated." But the elimination, it has now developed, merely involved the paper shift of a large number of personnel to the newly reconstituted office of collection and dissemination, with no net reduction in employees.

At the same time some of those in the intelligence picture—particularly a few "empire builders" in the CIA, who were being studied with particular interest by the Dulles commission—have apparently started an attempted "back-fire" against the Dulles group in an attempt to discredit it.

Mr. Dulles' survey, in other words, already has struck sparks, but if it is to achieve its purpose it must inevitably lead—in the opinion of those who have studied our intelligence agencies closely—to major personnel changes in our intelligence agencies, to some re-organizational and perhaps functional modifications, and to insistence upon better cooperation between all intelligence agencies.

[This is the first of a series of